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The confusion 1 engendered by lack of clarity in fundamental conceptions
such as "war,". "peace," and "law" begins with, and is perhaps most
clearly exhibited in, the traditional discussion of the many and disparate
problems frequently subsumed under headings like "The Initiation of
War," "The Commencement of War," "The Legal Meaning of War"
and "State and Effects of War," or under the simple query "When does
war exist (or begin) ?" The orthodox debates here have been concerned
mainly with determination of the beginning in time of a "legal state of
war." They have usually centered on the necessity and the relative
technical effect of a somewhat mystical animus belligerendi, manifested
either in the shape of a formal declaration of war or some other modality,
and of physical acts of coercion for the creation of such "state of war."
The confusion in these debates arises from a shifting reference to and
emphasis on the subjective animus of participants and the realities of
their coercive practices, as well as to certain assumed consequences of such
animus or practices, without relating either the animus or the practices to
the larger context of any particular instance of international coercion and
to the major community policies sought by authoritative decision-makers
with respect to various specific problems in such context.
Some publicists, for instance, have rigorously insisted that animus
belligerendi on the part of either the initiating or responding state is the
prime requisite which must be unequivocally revealed and without which
* The views expressed here are not to be imputed to the Government of the Philippines.
1 This brief essay, essentially a note on a suggested methodology, is written as the
second in a series of essays on the legal regulation of international coercion. The first
essay, on the processes of coercion and of decision, will appear in the May, 1958, issue
of the Yale Law Journal. Others will follow, dealing at length with the major types of
problems, from the resort to coercion, through the management of combat and non-
combat situations, to the termination of coercion. The documentation of this essay
reflects its position in the series.
The perspectives with which we begin are indicated somewhat cryptically in the
editorial "Peace and War: Factual Continuum With Multiple Legal Consequences,"
49 A.JI.L. 63 (1955).
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not "war," or a "state of war," but only "reprisals," or "intervention,"
or some other "measure short of war" may be regarded as having been
initiated. The formulation of this view achieved by Lord McNair about
three decades ago is now classical:
A state of war arises in International Law (a) at the moment,
if any, specified in a declaration of war; or (b) if none is specified,
then immediately upon the communication of a declaration of war; or
(c) upon the commission of an act of force, under the authority of a
State, which is done animo belligerendi, or which, being done sine
animo belligerendi but by way of reprisals or intervention, the other
State elects to regard as creating a state of war, either by repelling
force by force or in some other way; retroactive effect being given
to this election, so that the state of war arises on the commission of
the first act of force.2
Other writers, in clear contrast, have de-emphasized the subjectivities
of the participants and regard the commencement of "material war" as
simultaneously inducing a "legal status of war." Among the more recent
expressions of this position is Professor Kelsen's:
A state of war in the true and full sense of the term is brought
about only by acts of war, that is to say, by the use of armed force;
and only such a state may be, but need not necessarily be, terminated
by a peace treaty. Consequently war is a specific action, not a status.
From the point of view of international law, the most important fact
is the resort to war, and that means resort to an action, not resort to a
status. Some writers consider the intention to make war, the animus
belligerendi, of the state or states involved in war as essential. Animus
2" The Legal Meaning of War and the Relation of War to Reprisals," 11 Grotius
Society Transactions 29 at 45 (1925). Among those who have shared this view is
Quincy Wright, who wrote: "War begins when any state of the world manifests its
intention to make war by some overt act, which may take the form of an act of war,
a declaration of war or some ultimatum with a time limit-the existence of war is not
dependent upon the type of operations undertaken by the belligerents." ("Changes
in the Concept of War," 18 A.J.I.L. 755 at 758-759 (1924). Later, Professor
Wright submitted that where both belligerents disclaim an intention to make "war,"
"a state of war does not exist until such time as third states recognize that it does."
("When Does War Existl" 26 ibid. 362 at 366 (1932).) How the intention of a
third state is relevant in inter-belligerent relations is not explained.
In his Report on the Legal Position Arising from the Enforcement in Time of Peace
of the Measures of Economic Pressure Indicated in Article 16 of the Covenant, Particu-
larly by a Maritime Blockade (8 League of Nations Official Journal 834 (1927)), the
Secretary General of the League said: . . ."from the legal point of view, the existence
of a state of war between two states depends upon their intention and not upon the
nature of their acts. Accordingly, measures of coercion, however drastic, which are not
intended to create and are not regarded by the State to which they are applied as
creating a state of war, do not legally establish a relation of war between the State
concerned. " I
Similar statements may be found in Lawrence, The Principles of International Law
309 (7th ed., Winfield, 1928); 2 Westlake, International Law 1-2 (1907); Castr6n,
The Present Law of War and Neutrality 31-34 (1954); 2 Moller, International Law
in Peace and War 156 (trans. Pratt, 1935).
Professor Eagleton, too, seems to have shared this view: see "Acts of War," 35
A.J.I.L. 321 (1941). Of. Starke, An Introduction to International Law 363 (3rd ed.,
1954).
[Vol. 52
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beUigerendi means the intention to wage war. But this can only
be the intention to perform acts of war, that is to say, to use armed
force, with all the consequences international law attaches to the use
of armed force.
3
Still others have attempted, in interpreting the pattern of commitments
under the Covenant of the League of Nations, to combine both these "sub-
jective" and "objective" theories of "war" and assert that, while ordi-
narily animus belligerendi must be present for a "state of war" to com-
mence,
* . . if acts of force are sufficiently serious and long continued, then,
even if both sides disclaim any animus belligerendi and refuse to
admit that a state of war has arisen between them, there comes a
point at which the law must say to the parties, you are refusing to
recognize the facts; your actions are of a kind which it is the policy
of the law to characterize as war; and therefore, whatever you choose
to say about it, you have in fact set up a state of things which in the
eye of the law is a state of war.4
It should be observed that these formulations, like the comparable defi-
nitions of "war" which abound in the literature, make implicit, am-
biguous and indiscriminate references to both the "facts" and certain
asserted "legal consequences" of facts-to both the precipitating events
of resort to, and exercise of, international coercion and the responses of
authoritative decision-makers; in short, to both the process of factual
coercion and the process of legal authority. Premised as they are on the
ancient dichotomous categorization of "war" and "peace," there is ap-
parent in these formulations no recognition that the initiation of coercion
generates, not one unitary problem of ascertaining a precise moment in
time for the beginning of a singularly elusive and all-sufficing "legal state
s Principles of International Law 27 (1952). The protagonists of this side of the
debate include Risley, The Law of War 81-82 (1897); Baty, "Abuse of Terms: 'Recog-
nition'; 'War'," 30 A.J.I.L. 377 at 398 (1936); Ronan, "English and American
Courts and the Definition of War," 31 A.J.I.L. 642 at 656 (1937); Green, "The
Nature of the 'War' in Korea," 4 Int. Law Q. 462 at 468 (1951); Pye, "The
Legal Status of the Korean Hostilities," 45 Georgetown Law J. 45 at 48-51 (1956).
Cf. Hall, International Law 444-445 (8th ed., Pearce Higgins, 1924).
Professors Borehard and Stowell appeared to have favored this side: see Borchard,
" 'War' and 'Peace,' " 27 A.J.I.L. 114 (1933), and "When Did War Begin?"
47 Columbia Law Rev. 742 (1947); and Stowell, International Law 491 (1931).
Professor Hyde expressed the same view as Lord McNair (3 International Law
1693-1695[rev. ed., 1945]), but proposed at the same time that "the character of the
acts committed rather than the design of the actors should, and probably will be,
regarded as decisive of the legal result." (Ibid. 1688).
4Brierly, "International Law and Resort to Armed Force," 4 Cambridge Law
T. 308 at 313 (1932). Cf. Lauterpacht, " 'Resort to War' and the Interpretation
of the Covenant During the Manchurian Dispute," 28 A.J.I.L. 43 (1934), who does
not accept the "intention" theory of "war," but at the same time suggests that
"war" is not necessarily synonymous with the use of "armed force." These so-called
"subjective" and "objective" theories are summarized and discussed in Eagleton,
"The Attempt to Define War," International Conciliation, No. 291, p. 258 et seq.
(1933), and in Williams, Some Aspects of the Covenant of the League of Nations
298 et seq. (1934).
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of war," 5 but rather a whole series of complex problems. The problems
created in any particular instance of coercion, as will appear below, call
for the resolution of very different types of conflicting claims asserted by
various parties upon the initial stages of the process of coercion, and raise
greatly differing issues of legal policy for the different officials who must
reach a decision.
Increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional answers to the traditional
question is in modest measure displayed in the recent literature of inter-
national law. A number of scholars have sought, with varying degrees
of success, to bring significant clarification into the use of basic terms.
Dr. Grob, for instance, rejects with deserved ridicule the absolutistic
notion of "war in the legal sense" and of a "legal state of war." He
contends that what must be looked for is not "one over-all legal definition
of war" but rather a "variety of legal definitions." G Each "legal defi-
nition" he would formulate in relation to, and after ascertainment of,
"the particular intent and purpose" of the specific "rule of law on war"
which happens to be under consideration at a given time. The question
whether any particular exercise of coercion "constitutes" "war" or not
must, in his view, to be meaningful, specify a particular rule of law in
relation to which the "existence of war" may be affirmed or denied.T In
his analysis, to affirm or deny that a set of events marks the beginning
or existence of "war" is to assert that the specified rule of law is or is not
applicable to such events. The same exercise of coercion, which may
"legally constitute" "war" in relation to one rule of law on war, obviously
need not at the same stage " constitute " " war" in the sense of another rule ;
hence the relativity of which he speaks." The applicability or non-ap-
plicability of a given rule to given facts, Dr. Grob explains, "depends upon
its (the rule's) intent and purposes. It is the business of interpretation
to furnish that answer. It cannot be gleaned from anywhere else." O
Thus, for Dr. Grob, the basic task is reduced to the "interpretation" of
legal technicality.
Professor Stone exhibits considerably more restraint and diffidence in
his efforts at clarification. He still speaks of a "necessity," in view
5 Professor Wright stated the traditional point succinctly: "the incidence of an act
or declaration converting the state of peace into a state of war establishes a division
in time before which acts of war are illegal and after which they are legal between
belligerents . . ." ("Changes in the Concept of War," 18 A.J.I.L. 755 at 757
(1924)). Hence, traditionally, juristic effort has been directed towards determining
what acts or declarations convert "the state of peace" into a "state of war." And
see D~ak, "Computation of Time in International Law," 20 A.J.I.L. 502 at 506-508,
514 (1926) for a plea, made with great seriousness, that the exact date, hour and
minute for the beginning of a "state of war" be specified for the reason that "this
changes profoundly the juridical situation of each country" (at 506).
6 The Relativity of War and Peace 189 (1949).
7 Ibid. 202.
8 bid. 303: "Operations, as they progress . . .begin to be war legally at diverse
points of time. The question 'when does war legally begin?' thus requires not one
but several answers." See also ibid. 192, 194, 221-224, 318.
9 Ibid. 204.
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of the "wide ranging legal effects of war," of determining "the moment of
its legal commencement." The problem, to him, is "plain enough."
"War commences," Professor Stone writes, "when facts come into ex-
istence which satisfy the (above) definition of war." 10 Since his definition
of war is no more revolutionary than a rephrasing of the "intention" or
"subjective theory" of "war," he adheres closely to Lord McNair's formu-
lation quoted earlier. That he does not escape the ambiguity resulting
from a dual and simultaneous reference to "facts" and "legal conse-
quences" is perhaps most clearly shown in his casual remark that "war
begins with the earliest operative event." 11 Professor Stone, however,
departs from the wholly conventional treatment of the initiation of co-
ercion in two respects. First, he recognizes that "the moment" of
commencement of war "on the international level" need not necessarily
coincide with the beginning of war for differing "municipal legal pur-
poses." 12 Secondly, in the course of discussing the "legal consequences
of undeclared hostilities," he suggests that clarity in the question of "war
or no war" may be approached by recognizing that varying answers may
be given as "the purposes for which an answer is sought" vary.13  He
refers, as Dr. Grob did, to the purpose of individual rules or sets of rules
of war law, and of individual provisions of such instruments as the Pact
of Paris and the Charter of the United Nations. Unlike Dr. Grob, 14
however, he confines his suggestions to situations where the contending
participants not only fail to issue formal declarations of war but also dis-
claim an intent to engage in war and describe their coercive operations
by some other words. 15 The assumption of Professor Stone seems to be
that the relativity of "war or no war" is precluded by a declaration of
intent by either belligerent and that as soon as such a declaration is made,
there can be but one unvarying answer, whatever "the purposes for which
an answer is sought" may be.
*While recognizing that some measure of clarification has been achieved
10 Legal Controls of International Conflict 310 (1954). His definition of war is:
" a relation of one or more governments to at least one other government, in which at
least one of such governments no longer permits its relations with the other or others
to be governed by the laws of peace." (p. 304.)
"1 Ibid. 310, note 75.
12 Ibid. 310-311, 311, note 78. He gives some indication of what he means by
"municipal legal purposes": "It has become . . . a matter of legislative prudence
to fix explicitly the beginning and end of war for the purpose at hand in each major
field of legislative endeavor. They may, for example, be fixed at one point in relation
to wartime emergency powers, in another for regulation of private legal relations, and
this even though the legislature may seem to have left the matter open." (p. 311.)
Cf. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States 212-213 (1951); and Green,
"Armed Conflict, War, and Self-Defence," 6 Archiv des V6lkerreehts 387, 424, 438
(1957).
13 Stone, op. cit. 312. Professor Stone almost deprecates his own contribution, in-
sisting that its value is "rather de lege ferenda than as a description of existing law,"
and describing his observations as "most tentative" and "by no means coherent with
each other." (p. 313.)
21 See Grob, op. cit. 283-302.
%3 Stone, op. cit. 312.
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by both scholars, a measure which was anticipated by Judge Hudson,10
it may be observed that both appear unduly preoccupied with the technical
rules on which they have focused rather than on particular problems, par-
ticular policies and particular decision-makers. The task of clarification,
as will be indicated below, involves deeper difficulties than either Dr. Grob
or Professor Stone recognizes. It calls, contrary to the suggestion of the
former, for much more than ascertaining the "legal meaning" of words
used in particular formulations of prescriptions or the "exact intent and
purpose" of the formulators. 17 It demands, notwithstanding the sugges-
tion of the latter, that an inquirer go behind pronouncements of intent to
the factual and policy problems which are just as varied and complex when
such rituals are performed as when they are foregone. Both scholars
exhibit little awareness of the number and complexity of the variables in
the interrelated but distinguishable processes of coercion and of decision."8
They do not emphasize, in particular, that the application or non-applica-
tion of a particular rule to a particular situation of fact, if inquiry is to go
beyond abstract and normatively ambiguous statements, 9 must be viewed
as the product of a decisional process, and that such product can scarcely
be meaningfully studied unless the decision-maker (the applier) is identi-
fied, his policy objectives clearly articulated, and the various conditions
and the procedures of application specified.20 Both scholars stop short of
the effort to arrive at a comprehensive guiding theory for inquiry into the
problems, policies and prescriptions relating to the initiation of coercion
and violence. The several intellectual tasks indispensable to the achieve-
ment of deeper insight into the processes of coercion and decision and of
1s See his "IThe Duration of the War Between the United States and Germany,"
39 Harvard Law Rev. 1020 at 1020-1021 (1926).
17Dr. Grob conceives the basic task to be that of ascertaining the "legal reality,"
"the truth" and "legal meaning" of the "two central, all important terms 'war'
and 'peace' " (p. 36), of determining "what the rules of law on war mean" (p. 188).
His demand for "legal answers" leads him to say that "Arguing with facts alone will
not do. Mere facts prove nothing" (p. 201; italics in the original). The con-
ceptualism of his study thus does not extend to the clear relation of the facts of
coercion and the process of decision.
18 Some preliminary indication of what we mean by the process of coercion and the
process of decision may be obtained from McDougal, "Peace and War: Factual
Continuum With Multiple Legal Consequences," 49 A.J.I.L. 63 (1955). See also id.,
"El Derecho Internacional como Ciencia Politica," 3 Revista de Derecho y Ciencias
Sociales Nos. 3-4, p. 142 (1957, Buenos Aires).
19 For exposition of what is characterized as normative-ambiguity, see Lasswell and
McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public
Interest," 52 Yale Law 3. 203, 266-267 (1943).
2oAmplification of this general point is offered in McDougal, "Law As a Process
of Decision: A Poliey-Oriented Approach To Legal Study," 1 Natural Law Forum
53, 54-58, 64-68 (1956); and id., "The Comparative Study of Law For Value Pur-
poses: Value Clarification As An Instrument of Democratic World Order," 61 Yale
Law T. 915 (1952), 1 A.J. Comp. Law 24 (1952). See also Lasswell, "Current Studies
of the Decision Process: Automation versus Creativity," 8 Western Pol. Q. 381 (1955);
and Lerner and Lasswell (eds.), The Policy Sciences (1951). For an introduction to
the theory of decision-making, see Bross, Design For Decision (1953).
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closer approximation to community and preferred goals remain unper-
formed.21
Preoccupation with legal technicality is even more intense in Dr.
Kotzsch's recent study.2 Dr. Kotzsch, addressing himself, as Professor
Stone did, to the problem of "war without a declaration of war," works
out at labored length a distinction between "war in the material sense"
and "war in the formal sense." "Formal war," in his sense, is no more
than the "legal state of war" as conceived in all its rigor in traditional
theory, while "material war" includes all factual situations of military
conflict of some duration and extent (as distinguished from isolated acts of
violence) where, through disclaimer or lack of a showing of animus belli-
gerendi, no "legal state of war" is regarded as established. The main
difference to which he points is in terms of "legal consequences" and lies
in the extent of application of the law of war: "formal war" automatically
brings about the full operation of all the rules of war and neutrality;
"material war," on the other hand, as "institutionalized in the province
of international law," initiates only a "selective" application of those
rules."3 The question "war or no war," he writes, following Dr. Grob,
"henceforth must be specified by material or formal if a legal answer is
sought." 24 In Dr. Kotzsch's scheme, there is not one intermediate status
between "peace" and "war." There are instead, he asserts, two dicho-
tomies--"peace" and "formal war," and "peace" and "material war." 25
The initiation of international coercion may thus mark the commencement
of either "formal war" or of "material war," depending on whether or
not there is an announced animus belligerendi. "War" having been split,
21A brief itemization of recommended "intellectual tasks" may be found in Mc-
Dougal, "International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception," 82
Hague Academy Recueil des Cours 137, 141 (1953); and in the article cited note 20
supra, 1 Natural Law Forum at 58-59. See also Lasswell, The World Revolution of
Our Time-A Framework For Basic Policy Research (Hoover Institute Studies, 1951).
22 The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law (1956).
23Ibid. 52-65, 234-235, 241-244. Dr. Kotzsch differentiates his distinction from
that between "war in the legal sense" (war as a "legal condition1) and "war in the
material sense" (war as actual military operations) adverted to, for instance, by
Professor Wright (op. cit. note 2 gupra) in the following terms: "If we, however,
replace the distinction of war in the legal sense and war in the material sense by that of
war in the formal sense and war in the naterial sense, it is for the following reason:
The former distinction implies the idea that war in the legal sense is of relevancy under
international law whereas war in the material sense is not. This is not true. Both
forms have obtained their meaning under international law. By customary international
law legal consequences have been imputed to war in the inaterial sense .... " (p. 52.)
24 Ibid. 55.
25 Ibid. 241-244. Compare Jessup, "Should International Law Recognize an Inter-
mediate Status Between Peace and War?" 48 A.J.I.L. 98 (1954), and "Inter-
mediacy," 23 Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Ret 16 (1953); and Schwarzen-
berger, "Jus Pacis Ac Belli? Prolegomena to a Sociology of International Law,"
37 A.J.I.L. 460 (1943). In MeDougal, article cited note 18 supra, it was suggested,
apropos of the proposals for recognition and elaboration of a new "status intermediate
between war and peace," that a mode of analysis more comprehensive and flexible than
either dichotomy or trichotomy may be required if clarity and rationality are to be
promoted.
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so to speak, into the "formal" and "material," he states that it ("war")
no longer necessarily implies "the integral application of the sum-total of
the laws of war." 26 One of his main concerns appears to be to fashion
a doctrinal answer to belligerent claims, which have been asserted in the
past, to avoid the thrust of the law of war and neutrality by labeling their
physical operations with some other name. Dr. Kotzsch's aspirations in
his scholarly study are admirable. It would seem open to serious doubt,
however, whether its conceptualism, which is at times less than lucid, can
offer more than minimal help in clarifying the problems of legal policy
attendant upon the initiation of coercion and in increasing the incidence
of rational decisions.
The first step, we submit, towards contact with reality is reference to,
and careful orientation in, the factual process of coercion across national
boundaries. In broad preliminary characterization, this process of coercion
may be described in terms of various participants applying to each other
coercion of alternately accelerating and decelerating degrees of intensity,
for a wide range of objectives, utilizing methods which include the em-
ployment of all known distinctive strategies or instruments of policy, under
the variable conditions of a world arena in continuous flux 27  It may be
observed that, in the course of this process of coercion, the participants
assert against each other many varying claims respecting the lawfulness
and unlawfulness of the particular coercive practices being utilized by
or against them, invoking both world prescriptions and world opinion to
fortify their respective assertions.
The description we suggest of factual coercion in terms of "process"
is intended not merely to convey a sense of the variety in participant,
purpose, modality and claim, but also to emphasize the facts of continuity
-continuity in coercive action and reaction and in assertion and counter-
assertion-and of changing intensities in degree, from the mildest to the
most severe applications of coercion. Between the two extremes of "pure"
peace and "total" war, the states of the world arena may in these terms be
observed continuously to engage each other for power and other values, by
26 Op. cit. note 22 supra, at 243. Through his two dichotomies (or trichotomy), he
also attempts to resolve the old debate on the "subjective" and "objective" tests
of the beginning or existence of war by combining the two: "The concept of war in
the material and formal senses pays regard to both the purely objective test of war
and the subjective test, which is the essence of the status theory of war. It resolves
the doctrinal conflict between the objective and subjective theories of war by the as-
sumption that these theories are not mutually exclusive but complementary" (pp. 54--
55). The minor point has been suggested above that such observations are apt to be
no more than exercises in legal syntactics unless both the perspectives of participants
and their physical operations are considered in the larger context of the particular
instance of coercion involved. The major point is that Dr. Kotzsch's framework for
inquiry seems to us less than completely adequate even for the modest goal he set for
bimself--''to describe the modern concept of war in general international law" (p.
2; italics supplied).
27 Compare Wright, "International Conflict and the United Nations," 10 World
Politics 24, 34-44 (1957), who describes the processes of conflict among states in terms
of the parties, their relations, and the field in which conflicts occur.
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all instruments of policy, in a continuum of degrees in coercive practices,
ranging from the least intense to the most intense .2  From this orientation,
to speak of the initiation of coercion is to refer to those stages of the
factual process at which coercion is still at a relatively low degree of in-
tensity but accelerating towards the peak intensity of maximum use of the
military instrument for destruction. 29
At such initiation stages of the coercion process, participants of all
categories-including officials of the contending belligerents, officials of
international organizations and of non-belligerents (who are non-partici-
pants in the process of coercion but nevertheless assert certain claims),
and individual nationals of both the belligerents and non-belligerents-
begin, as suggested, to make certain claims against each other. An indica-
tion of the rich complexity of the structure of such contraposed claims may
be had even from impressionistic description.
Thus, in one type of controversy, a belligerent asserts, as against a
target state and international officials who are representatives of the world
public order, claims to initiate highly coercive or violent means of modifying
the existing world public order and the world distribution of power and
other values. The assertion of these claims frequently marks the culmina-
tion of a longer or shorter period during which an intensifying degree of
coercion was exerted by and against the claimant through non-military
instruments, or in which the dimensions of military force were kept short
of open and substantial destruction. At a certain stage in intensity,
officials of the target state may respond with claims to employ retaliatory
coercion in the name of self-defense. International officials may, for their
part, make claims to competence to characterize such coercion and violence
as unlawful breaches of the public order of the world community and to
take appropriate steps forcibly to redress such breaches.
Similarly, in another type of controversy, the belligerents, including
both the attacking and defending states and, where community responsi-
bility is successfully organized, international armed forces, make claims
28 The point is made more or less explicitly in any number of studies on international
relations; see, e.g., Haas and Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations, Ch. 3
(1956); Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Chs. 3-6 (2nd cd., 1954); Strausz-Hup6
and Possony, International Relations, Chs. 1-3 (2nd cd., 1954) ; Schwarzenberger, Power
Politics 17 and Chs. 6-12 (1951); Kalijarvi and Associates, Modern World Politics,
Ch. 3 (3rd ed., 1953). On the fluctuations and periodicity of the magnitude of co-
ercion and violence over long periods of history, see 3 Sorokin, Social and Cultural
Dynamics 259-380 (1937).
29 Cf. 2 Wright, A Study of War 698 (1942): "... analysis of the military,
psychological, legal, and sociological manifestations of war suggests that all may be
regarded as variables which reach a certain threshhold of intensity in actual war.
War may therefore be regarded from the standpoint of each belligerent as an extreme
intensification of military activity, psychological tension, legal power, and social inte-
gration-an intensification which is not likely to result unless the enemy is approxi-
mately equal in material power." At 689: ". . . the time space continuum, which in
a legal sense is designated a war, has not necessarily been accompanied by a unity or
uniformity of intense military activity. While in international legal theory a state
of war between two states begins and ends at definite moments of time, these moments
have frequently been difficult to establish in practice."
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against each other to engage in the different component practices of military
violence to secure their respective objectives. This general claim to employ
the military instrument may be given operational meaning in terms of the
detailed claims of each to apply violence in the capture or destruction of
the other's bases of power by employing certain combatants with certain
weapons, in certain areas of operations, and against certain objects of
attack. The negating claim asserted in turn by each against the other is
that the violence exerted is inhuman, unnecessary or disproportionate, or,
in more detail, that certain combatants are unauthorized, that certain
weapons are unlawful, that certain areas of operations are beyond per-
missible bounds, and that certain objects may not legitimately be captured
or destroyed. Both belligerents may also, before or after the outburst of
military violence, claim to cut off, with varying degrees of completeness,
diplomatic and consular relations and the commerce, communication and
transportation between them, and to terminate or continue observance of
previous agreements with each other.
In still another type of controversy, representatives of the world public
order claim, mostly after the stage of overt violence has been reached,
competence to activate the commitments of third states to participate in
organized community measures designed to repress violence character-
ized as unlawful. Non-belligerents may respond favorably and claim a
right to participate, or unfavorably and set up claims to avoid participa-
tion, in community sanctions procedures. Where the pattern of com-
munity responsibility fails, and the international officials are unable
effectively to assert claims of authority, a second set of claims assumes
special importance. Belligerents demand from third states non-participa-
tion and non-augmentation of the other belligerent's power resources.
Third states make countering demands for non-interference with their
nationals, resources and normal activities.
In a fourth type of controversy, each belligerent may be observed to
begin, at points of varying time before or after the stage of active military
hostilities, making claims to exercise more or less comprehensive control
over the industry, commerce, labor, communications, transportation, price
and consumption levels, private agreements and property, and personal
activities of individuals within its own territory. Internal value processes
are governmentalized in increasingly high degree, in the effort to organize,
maximize, manage and effectively utilize the belligerent's bases of power.
Each belligerent further claims authority to define and discriminate be-
tween "enemy persons" and non-enemy persons, and to impose more rigid
controls on the former's persons and property, both for preventing their
utilization by the enemy belligerent and for satisfying its own military
needs. The countering claim of "enemy persons" is for respect for their
human dignity, loyalties and property.
There is a fifth type of controversy where individuals assert against
other individuals, at differing points along the continuum of coercion,
certain claims and counterclaims, the most conspicuous of which are to
require, or refrain from, or terminate, the honoring of certain commit-
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ments, and to certain specific interpretations of so-called "war clauses" in
documents such as, for instance, insurance policies and charter parties. It is
in connection with the latter type of claims that much of the judicial dis-
cussion on "When does (or did) war begin?" has taken place.3 0  It is
soThe "war clause" in life insurance policies is typically a clause excluding or
limiting the liability of the insurer in case the insured dies as a result of, or while
engaged in, service in the armed forces in "time of war." The wording of the "war
clause" has, of course, varied in different policies. The technical issue, however, has
usually been presented in the form of whether or not, at the time of the insured's death,
there was "war" either between the state of the forum and another state or between
foreign states.
The cases which arose in American courts during World War II commonly involved
deaths which occurred on Dec. 7, 1941, during the attack by Japanese forces on Pearl
Harbor. A group of cases-e.g. West v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 25 S.E. 2d 475
(1943), 202 S.C. 422; Rosenau v. Idaho Mutual Benefit Assn., 145 Pac. 2d 227 (1944),
65 Idaho 408; Savage v. Sun Life Insurance Co., 57 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. La.,
1944); Pang v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 37 Hawaii 208 (1945)-allowed recovery by
the beneficiary, holding that because the U. S. Congress, to which the Constitution
had allocated the power to declare war, had not declared war until Dec. 8, 1941, and
had not made its declaration retroactive (as the President had requested) to Dec. 7,
there was as yet no "state of war," or "war in the legal" or "constitutional sense,"
on the latter date. These cases relied on a concept that courts may not take judicial
notice of the existence of a war until it is formally and officially declared by the
Congress, and distinguished between an "act of war" and a "4state of war." In
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F. 2d 260 (C.C.A. 10th, 1946), 41 A.J.I.L. 680
(1947), cert. denied, 331 U. S. 811 (1947), noted in 56 Yale L.J. 746 (1947), however,
the court, under an identical set of facts, denied recovery against the insurer, holding
that the existence of a state of war was not dependent upon its formal declaration but
was determinable from an appraisal of actualities, and that there bad been a sufficient
political determination (by the President) of the existence of war commencing with
the attack on Pearl Harbor. Cf. Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366,
44 N.E. 2d 687 (1942), where the insured seaman died when the USS .Reuben James
was torpedoed by German submarines on Oct. 30, 1941; and Vanderbilt v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 112 Misc. 248, 184 N.Y.S. 54 (1920), where the insured lost his life when
the Lusitania was sunk.
A similar set of life insurance cases arose out of deaths which occurred during the
United Nations action in Korea. Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa.
231, 95 A. 2d 202 (1953), and Harding v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 171 Pa.
Super. 236, 90 A. 2d 589, rehearing denied, 95 A. 2d 221 (1953), held that since war
had not been declared by Congress, the conflict in Korea did not constitute a "'war"
in the "constitutional" or "legal" sense, and permitted recovery against the insurer.
Other courts have taken the opposite stand in a long line of cases: e.g. Stanberry v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Super. 498, 98 A. 2d 134 (1953); Langlas V. Iowa Life
Ins. Co., 245 Iowa 713, 63 N.W. 2d 885 (1954); Gudewicz V. John Hancock Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 331 Mass. 752, 122 N.E. 2d 900 (1954); Christensen v. Sterling Ins. Co.,
284 Pac. 2d 287 (1955); Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows, 152 Tex. 559,
261 S.W. 2d 554 (1953), cert. denied, 347 U. S. 928 (1954); Lynch -v. National Life and
Accident Ins. Co., 278 S.W. 2d 32 (1955); Weissman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
112 F. Supp. 420 (D.C.S.D. Cal., 1953); Gagliormella v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co,
122 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. Mass., 1954); Carius v. New York Life Ins. Co., 124 F. Supp.
388 (D.C.S.D. I1., 1954); and Wilkinson -v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 151
N.Y.S. 2d 1018 (1956).
For cases involving charter parties containing "war risk" clauses, see Kawasaki
Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Bantham Steamship Co. Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 544, and
Spanish Government v. North of England Steamship Co. Ltd., [1938] 54 T.L.R. 852.
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perhaps an index of the extent of the common confusion that it is pre-
cisely this type of private claims in the resolution of which the world
prescriptions and fundamental world community policies relating to
coercion are really largely, if not wholly, irrelevant. The basic problem
raised by these claims is not that of distinguishing between permissible
and non-permissible exercises of coercion, nor that of formulating distinc-
tions between the "legal" and the "non-legal" senses of "war" or "block-
ade" or comparable terms, as Professor Stone seems to suggest,31 but
rather that of discerning and giving effect, within the limits of any over-
riding community policy, to the major purposes and expectations which
the private parties to the document in question sought to project.3 2
It is not, of course, meant to be suggested that in each and every con-
text in which coercion is initiated, all the participants actually make all
31 Stone, op. cit. 304, note 40, 310, note 77, 314, note 92.
32 It seems fairly obvious that the question of the commencement or existence of a
"state of war," or "war in the legal sense" or simply "war," between two countries
as determined for the very different purposes of the world public order is but of
tangential, if any, relevance to this problem, which calls essentially for the application
of familiar principles of interpretation. The approach adopted in the Bennion case
(note 30 supra), where the court inquired into the expectations of the parties as to
what risks would be excluded exemplifies the point we are making. The court said:
"The subject matter of the contract was a risk assured on the life of the insured by
the Company, for a stipulated premium, and the use of the word war was obviously
intended to denote a restriction or limitation upon the risk assumed. It is plain,
therefore, that the definition given to the word war bears a direct relationship to the
risk assumed. . . . Viewed in this light, it is also plain that when the parties used the
word war, they had in mind the hazard to human life incident" (158 F. 2d at 265).
Obviously, the hazard to life was not dependent on a situation of military violence
being characterized as a "war" or "state of war." This approach was adopted in
the eases arising out of the Korean conflict starting from the Stanberry case (note
30 supra).
In the Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha case (note 30 supra) the court refused
to hold the steamship company liable for damages for canceling the charter-party under
a clause authorizing such cancellation by either party "if war breaks out involving
Japan." The court held in effect that the contingency provided for by the parties
had occurred, despite the fact that neither Japan nor China (in 1937) had issued
formal declarations of war and that the two countries maintained diplomatic relations
with each other. Again, the risk that the parties sought to provide against did not
depend upon the presence or absence of "animus belligerendi" in either or both
countries. The Master of the Rolls said: "I am unable to accept the suggestion that
there is any technical meaning of the word 'war' for the purpose of the construction
of this clause. . . . It seems to me that to suggest that, within the meaning of this
charter party, war had not broken out involving Japan on the relevant date is to at-
tribute to the parties to it a desire to import into their contract some obscure and un-
certain technicalities of international law rather than the common sense of business-
men."I
In the Spanish Government case (note 30 supra), Lewis, J., did say that the word
"blockade" in a clause to the effect that the vessel would not be bound to proceed to
"blockade ports," was used in its " strict legal sense."I However, regardless of whether
a "strict legal sense" or some other sense was to be imparted to "blockade," the
court explicitly found that the risk provided against never materialized, that the
announced intention of the Franco Government to blockade certain ports was never
carried out, and that there was no greater danger or risk of interference with British
vessels after the Nationalist announcement than before.
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the above types of claims. In any particular constellation of events, one
or more of the participants may, for diverse reasons, refrain from as-
serting any one or more of the kinds of claims that such participants
might otherwise be expected to assert. For instance, organs of interna-
tional governmental organizations may restrain themselves from, or may
postpone characterizing, exercises of coercion by a particular belligerent
as non-permissible, or calling for collective enforcement action, because
of low estimates of the degree of probable conformity. 3 Again, because
of expectations of excessive material and human costs which a military
response may occasion, a target nation-state may decline to claim to meet
force with force. The bloodless conquest of Czechoslovakia and the military
occupation of Denmark by Nazi Germany in 1939 and 1940 are obvious
examples of this situation.3 4  A belligerent of negligible military cap-
abilities and with relative security from military attack may also content
itself with controlling enemy persons or taking enemy property within
its territory and not claim actively to use the military instrument. Cer-
tain Latin American countries which joined the Allied Powers in both
world wars sequestered private German property without engaging in or
contributing to actual military operations against Germany.33
From careful orientation in the processes of coercion and claim, the
next step we recommend in the clarification of the ambiguous and con-
fusing reference of the "commencement of war" is an equally careful
orientation in the process of legal decision by which community inter-
vention is organized in the attempt to regulate international coercion.
This second process may be described, in highest-level abstraction, as was
the process of coercion, in terms of certain established decision-makers
seeking certain common policy objectives under the varying conditions of
the world arena, by certain methods or procedures of formulating and
applying authoritative prescriptions. From such perspective, it must be
apparent that the great variety of claims asserted by varying parties at
various points in the factual cordinuum of coercion, generate just as great
a variety of policy problems, all traditionally lumped together under one
simple label. It is to these "facts," claims and problems, that the dif-
ferent decision-makers, who include officials of international govern-
3s Goodrich and Simons, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International
Peace and Security 364-365 (1955), point out that this was an important reason for
postponing action by the Security Council under Art. 39 of the Charter in the Palestine
case, and for the delay in the determination by the General Assembly of the commission
of aggression by the Peoples' Republic of China in the Korean case. Of. on the point
made in the text, Wright, "The Prevention of Aggression," 50 A.J.I.L. 514 at 516
(1956); and Lauterpacht, op. cit. note 4, supra, at 55, 59 (on the Manchurian incident
of 1931).
34 On the case of Czechoslovakia, see Survey of International Affairs, 1938, Vol. 3,
pp. 247-288 (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953); on the occupation of
Denmark, see "Hitler's Europe," Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, p. 519
et seq. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954).
5 See Grob, op. cit. 293-294, and Kotzsch, op. cit. 248-250; see also "The War and
the Neutrals," Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, pp. 114-136 (Royal Institute
of International Affairs, 1956).
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mental organizations and judges of international courts and arbitration
tribunals, as well as civil and military officials of both belligerents and
non-belligerents, respond and attach "legal consequences" in the shape
of decisions about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of any particular ap-
plication or avoidance of coercion. The detailed issues of policy, as might
be expected, commonly differ as the specific contexts and controversies
differ.
Relying upon the categorizations used in sketching the structure of
claims asserted upon the initiation of coercion, and anticipating in briefest
outline the results of other inquiries, we may observe authoritative decision-
makers to be seeking, in the belligerent versus target belligerent and inter-
national officials type of controversy, to prevent change through coercive
procedures (or procedures involving a high degree of coercion), to promote
change through non-coercive procedures (or procedures involving only a
minimum degree of coercion) and to maintain a world public order of
varying consistency with the values of a free society3 At the same time,
the community seeks to harness coercion to the maintenance of order by
authorizing coercion as an individual, group or community response to
unauthorized coercion. These complementary policies are sought by in-
voking and applying, with varying degrees of success, fundamental pre-
scriptions which discriminate between different coercive practices and
characterize some as non-permissible and others as permissible.
In the controversies between belligerents about the conduct of hostilities,
the authoritative decision-makers bring to bear the familiar, equally com-
plementary, principles of military necessity and humanitarianism. The
basic effort is to minimize the unnecessary destruction of values through the
application of a law of war sustained by the same principle which sustains
saWe have, for the purpose of economy in expression, spoken of "1the" public
order of the world community. It is a fact of contemporary international life, how-
ever, that there is no single world public order as such, or a single conception thereof.
There appear, rather, competing demanded conceptions of world public order and of
international law, some of which are compatible with the postulated goal of wide
sharing of values while others are not. See, e.g., Stone, op. cit. 57-64; Kunz, "Plural-
ism of Legal and Value Systems and International Law," 49 A.J.I.L. 370 (1955);
Wilk, "International Law and Global Ideological Conflict: Reflections on the Uni-
versality of International Law," 45 ibid. 648 (1951) ; Schwarzenberger, "IThe Impact of
the East-West Rift on International Law," 36 Grotius Society Transactions 229 (1950);
Smith, The Crisis of the Law of Nations, Ch. 2 (1947).
On the Soviet conception of international law, see, e.g., Hazard, Law and Social
Change in the U.S.S.R., Ch. 11 (1953); id., The Soviet Union and International Law
189 et seq. (1950); Soloveitchik, "International Law as IInstrument of Politics,' "
21 U. of Kansas City Law Rev. 169 (1953); Kulski, "The Soviet Interpretation of
International Law," 49 A.J.I.L. 518 (1955); Schlesinger, Soviet Legal Theory, Ch.
10 (2nd ed., 1951); Taracouzio, The Soviet Union and International Law (1935);
Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law (1955).
On the Nazi German conception of intetnational law, see Preuss, "National Socialist
Conceptions of International Law," 29 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 594 (1935); Gott, "The
National Socialist Theory of International Law," 32 A.J.I.L. 704 (1938); and Florin
and Herz, "Bolshevist and National Socialist Doctrines of International Law," 7
Social Research 1 (1940).
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the self-interest of belligerents-the principle of economy in the exercise of
coercion and force.
In the confrontation of international officials or belligerents and non-belli-
gerents about participation, two sets of policies, corresponding to the two
sets of claims we have noted, are successively sought by the established
decision-makers. In the first, the community attempts to secure the
maximum possible of common responsibility for repressing coercion authori-
tatively designated as unlawful by limiting the extent to which non-
participation is permissible. The complementary policy of minimizing
involvement and localizing the area of violence is urged by those who
seek possible advantages in non-participation. In the second set, authori-
tative decision-makers are seeking, in determining the relative rights and
duties of belligerents and non-belligerents, to adjust and balance the
contraposed policies of military effectiveness, in terms of the isolation of the
enemy belligerent, and of reducing to a minimum the consequent disrup-
tions of the value processes of non-belligerents.
In the fourth type of controversy, i.e., belligerent vis-d-vis individuals
in the belligerent's own territory, and insofar as the control of "enemy
persons" is concerned, the competing policies to be reconciled refer to
the security interests of the belligerent and to the human rights of "enemy"
individuals. Respecting the control of enemy property, the basic policies
discernible in the few vague and disputed limitations interposed by
international law have been described in terms of the protection of private
property and the encouragement of free worldwide circulation of wealth
and of the satisfaction of the security and military needs of the bellig-
erent. Substantially the same policies are at stake, though perhaps in
differing degree, in the regulation and utilization by a belligerent of its
own nationals and their property. Such policies are here, however,
sought to be secured for the most part, if not wholly, through the medium
of municipal rather than international prescription; decision-makers ex-
ternal to the state have imposed but few controls. The historic frame of
reference for such problems is that which Professor Stone designated as
"war" for ''municipal legal purposes."
In the fifth type of controversy-individuals against individuals-
authoritative decision-makers, in regulating private transactions involving
what might be called an "enemy element," seek an equilibrium between
protection of the military interests of the belligerent and maintenance of
the stability of expectations created by such transactions. Like the pre-
ceding context, this is much regulated by municipal law.
With such brief orientation in both the practices of coercion and the
responses evoked from the various authoritative decision-makers, it may
now be possible to achieve some further clarification of the legal policy
problems commonly associated with the initiation, as distinguished from
the management and termination, of processes of coercion. We have, as-
suming the perspective of the non-participant observer, described the
process of coercion in terms of accelerating and decelerating degrees of
intensity-that is, in terms of stages in a process of constant change. We
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have also noted that the participants in this process make different appeals
to authority at different stages, to which appeals the established decision-
makers of the world public order respond, invoking different sets of
policies and supporting prescriptions in granting or denying such appeals.
Considering both the differences in the claims presented to the authorita-
tive decision-makers and the differences in the policies and prescriptions
which such decision-makers deem relevant to the respective types of prob-
lems created by those claims, it would seem reasonably clear to an out-
side observer that there is no one, unique and unitary "when" question
that can be fruitfully asked about the application of authority in processes
of coercion. To raise, as earlier text-writers have commonly done, one
single, undifferentiated "when does war begin" question is to attempt at
once to comprehend and transcend all the varying categories of prob-
lems, thus placing an impossible burden on communication. Accord-
ingly, the general "when" question about the r6le of authority in coercion
processes must be individualized and asked in respect of each specific
type of problem. To put the point more positively, the allegedly unitary
question must be dissolved into a number of more specific inquiries of
how, in differing specified configurations of interrelated and variable
factors, certain decision-makers may be expected to respond to certain
characteristic claims as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of certain ex-
ercises or avoidances of coercion. So conceived, a "when" question may
be regarded as a semantically equivalent, if cryptic, way of referring to
the peculiar constellation of all the elements in a given context which
elicits certain responses from decision-makers. In this sense, the con-
ventional question "When does war exist (or begin) ?" amounts, in equally
conventional language, to the question of "What constitutes war?"
From these perspectives, to speak, for instance, of when coercion is
prohibited (or when prescriptions on aggression, or threat to or breach of
the peace, and self-defense become applicable) is only to refer to the
totality of factors-like the chronological priority of resort to coercion;
the type and intensity of the coercion exercised; the proportionality of
the target state's coercive response; the objectives of both the initiator and
the target states; the type and purpose of the decision demanded; the
probability and costs of effective decision and so on-which decision-
makers, explicitly or otherwise, take into account in characterizing certain
applications of coercion as non-permissible. Similarly, to raise the ques-
tion when non-participation is permissible (or when the rules on neutral-
ity are applicable) is to pose for consideration the relative relevance for
differing decision-makers of such factors as the formal commitments of
the members of international security organizations, the procedures avail-
able for making operative such commitments, the non-member status of
a participant or non-participant, the character and degree of participa-
tion demanded, the intensity, spatial location and extent of the violence
involved, and the differences in power between the participants and non-
participants. In like manner, to ask when certain modalities of combat
are proscribed (or when certain rules on the conduct of hostilities are
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applicable) is to inquire into the relevant details of the level of destruc-
tion sought or secured, which, in varying specific contexts, may include
among others: the character and authorization of combatants; the type,
magnitude and duration of the damage inflicted; the geographic locale of
operations; the nature of the objects of attack and the degree to which they
constitute effective enemy power bases; and the quantum of control achieved
over such bases of enemy power. Again, to seek to determine when certain
coercive controls may be taken by a participant over certain persons and re-
sources in non-combat situations (or when rules, international or municipal,
on the definition and treatment of "enemy" and non-"enemy" persons and
property are applicable) is to consider the shifting patterns, as presented
to decision-makers, of such elements as expectations of impending violence;
the formal allegiance and factual loyalties of individuals; the ownership
of property, public or private; the degree of actual control by the enemy;
the location, type and possible uses of the property regulated; and the
security and military needs of the acting participants. Finally, to inquire
into when regulation of, or interference in, private transactions is per-
missible (or when certain rules on the effects of war on contracts are
applicable) is to assess the impact on decisions of data like the location
of the parties in relation to the line of war; the time, i.e., the stage in the
coercion process, of the formation of the agreement; the stage of per-
formance of the contract; the effects of performance, in terms of the extent
to which enemy resources may thereby be augmented or to which the
belligerent's own resources may be diminished; and the timing of benefits.
From the above partial listing, it would appear fairly obvious that
authoritative decision-makers, in reaching decision, in fact respond not
merely to the time, i.e., the particular stage in the process of coercion, at
which the opposing claims to be accommodated are asserted, but also to
the whole constellation of significant variables that make up the context of
such assertions. The special significance to be accorded to the fact of the
stage in the process of coercion is dependent upon the relation of such
fact to the other equally important variables; the datum of time acquires
relevance only within the other co-ordinates, as it were, of particular
situations. Hence, as intimated above, "when" questions call for much
more than a simple reference to the stage in coercive processes at which
certain claims are made. They are appropriately posed, not in terms
of the relation of some single factor, such as a declaration of animus
belligerendi 37 or a cannon shot, to a calendar or clock, but in terms rather
37 It is somewhat difficult to follow Professor Stone's position when he says that the
1907 Hague Convention III "lacks any substantial modern function" (op. cit. 309,
note 66), considering that lie follows Lord MeNair in assigning the time stated in a
formal declaration of war (when made), or the time of its communication, as "the
moment of its (war's) legal commencement" (ibid. 310).
It is true, however, that the Convention is pointless insofar as the prevention of
surprise attacks is concerned; for the period of time between the communication of
the declaration or ultimatum and the beginning of hostilities was left undetermined,
such that even an infinitesimal space of time would apparently satisfy the requirement
of "previous warning." See Hall, op. cit. note 3 supra, at 451-452. Westlake,
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of the relations of the different factors inter se and to the policies of world
public order regarded as material to the type of problem under considera-
tion.
An authoritative decision-maker, in determining the legal import to be
ascribed to any particular constellation of variables on any specific prob-
lem, may and does rationally take into account sequence relationships
of "beforeness," "afterness" and "simultaneousness" among variables
(and this is what we mean by "stage" in a process of coercion). Once
such decision-maker has determined to attach certain "legal consequences"
(or apply certain prescriptions) rather than others, to the "facts" of
coercion alleged before him, he may equally rationally and casually assign
a calendar date for the beginning of the ascription of the determined
Iconsequences" (or for the applicability of the prescriptions determined).
But the assignment of time he makes is a function of his reaction to all
the factors constitutive of the specific context and hence varies from prob-
lem to problem. Irrationality comes in when some subsequent decision-
maker or commentator seizes on one date so assigned for one problem, ob-
jectifies it into a monistic concept of "the commencement of war," and
projects such concept as allegedly controlling for other problems in fact
raising differing policy issues. Rationality, in fine, in the determination
of "when war begins" requires not a marking of one or even a few dates
in a calendar, nor a search for one decisive factor, for the applicability
in abstracto of prescriptions, but rather the clarification of what world
community policies are uniquely relevant to varying claims of authority
at varying stages in coercion processes. A policy-oriented approach is
not a single-factor but a multiple-factor approach; rational policy is not
uni-temporal but multi-temporal.
Because of the difficulties thus indicated in isolating the special sig-
nificance that the stage in the coercion process at which claims are as-
serted may have from the cumulative impact of all the other factors on
decision, it would accordingly appear more rational to study that factor,
insofar as it does have, in a particular type of controversy, any special
significance, in the course of more comprehensive inquiries into each of the
various types of controversies. Such a mode of inquiry might begin with
a more careful discrimination of the different types of major recurring
controversies and proceed, within each type of controversy, to a more
comprehensive itemization of the factors significantly affecting decision.
op. cit. note 2 supra, at 267, noted that a "very moderate proposal" of a 24-bour
interval made by The Netherlands' Delegation to the Conference of 1907 was rejected;
contrast this with the fact that during the days of the ancient jut fetiale, provision
was frequently made in declarations that hostilities would not begin till after 33 days
(See 2 Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece andi Rome 200
(1911)). In our own age when rocket missiles and artificial satellites travel at
velocities measured in tens of thousands of miles per hour, it would seem somewhat
optimistic to suggest, as Professor Castr6n does (op. cit. note 2 supra, at 99), that
a "time of grace" or an "intermediary period" should be given in the future.
For the possible uses of a declaration of war in contexts other than the conduct of
hostilities, see Eagleton, "The Form and Function of the Declaration of War," 32
A.J.I.L. 19 (1938).
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From such contextual orientation, an inquirer might, it is to be hoped,
much more effectively seek to perform the various intellectual tasks deemed
essential to policy-oriented study, including: the clarification of policies, the
observation and comparison through time of past trends in decision, the
identification in relative detail of the more significant conditioning
elements, the projection of past trends into future probabilities, and the
recommendation of preferred alternatives designed to secure the values
of a free society.3 8
3sFor further indication of what we refer to as "the values of a free society,"
see McDougal, op. cit. note 21 tupra, 82 Recueil des Cours at 188-191 (1953); Mc-
Dougal and Leighton, "The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional
Illusions versus Rational Action," 59 Yale L.J. 60, 60-72 (1949). See also, generally,
Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society (1950); Lasswell, Power and Personality
(1948); and id., "Political Power and Democratic Values," in Kornhauser (ed.),
Problems of Power in American Democracy 57-82 (1957).
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